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MEASUREMENTS IN THE ENGINEERING SCIENCES: AN EPISTEMOLOGY 





 One of the earliest uses of measurements was their well-known role in trade, where the ability to 
use rudimentary measures of weight not only made it possible to barter with food and raw materials 
but also enabled things to be built and manufactured. The simple ability to measure the length of 
things by means of specific units, combined with some elementary arithmetic and geometry, enabled 
craftsmen to design and construct things such as cathedrals, castles, bridges, houses, musical 
instruments, furniture, tools and clothes. Reflecting further upon this observation, we come to 
realise that it is the ability of humans to measure and apply basic mathematics that makes it possible 
to design things at all. Designers can work out on paper or by means of computer simulations how to 
build something that does not yet exist – how to construct, say, a building or a ship whose size 
matches our needs and is stable and strong enough while also satisfying our aesthetic ideals. More 
than this, though, our ability to measure and calculate makes subsequent epistemic uses of the 
design possible. In the actual process of construction the epistemic uses of a design include, for 
instance, calculating the quantity of materials to be used and the dimensions of the component 
parts. 
This perspective on the role of measurements and mathematics in the design of artefacts can be 
extended to the design of more advanced technologies, such as those found in chemical engineering, 
biomedical engineering and nanotechnology. These differ from the examples of technological 
artefacts just mentioned in that the latter are considered primarily in terms of having a function 
suitable for certain uses by humansi, whereas more advanced technologies usually ‘do something’ 
themselves: they produce something, they generate changes and transformations and they perform 
technological activities (or have the capacity to do so). This kind of technological functioning is often 
described in terms of physical-technological processes (e.g. the conversion of chemical compounds 
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or the conversion of light into an electric current) and capacities (e.g. the capacity of a material to 
resist an electric current or the capacity of a chemical catalyst to accelerate a chemical reaction). 
As a consequence of this difference, the ‘naïve’ picture sketched above, in which the ability to 
measure properties of objects such as size, shape and weight enables the design of, say, a house, is 
insufficient for understanding how measurements enable the design of advanced technologies.ii This 
is because such design additionally involves the measurement of physical properties that manifest 
only in specific physical-technological circumstances. Crucial to the argument developed in this 
article is the fact that these kinds of properties can be measured only when they manifest, i.e. when 
they become apparent as a result of specific physical-technological circumstances; these properties 
are ‘capacities’, so to speak. Strictly speaking, then, physical properties are actually measured by 
means of the measurement of physical phenomena.iii iv 
The key idea being proposed here is that the ability to measure the physical properties of materials 
and technological devices is the very thing that makes the design of a technology possible in the first 
place and enables the epistemic uses of a design in the actual manufacture of a technology.v The 
reasoning behind this idea is as follows: physical phenomena produce the technological functioning 
(and malfunctioning) of technological devices.vi Therefore, designing a technological device requires 
knowledge of physical phenomena, and this knowledge is acquired by means of measurements and 
mathematization. The aim of this article is to outline an epistemology of producing knowledge of 
physical phenomena and to highlight, in particular, the way such knowledge of physical phenomena 
is produced using measurements and mathematization. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly explains what ‘knowledge of a physical 
phenomenon’ must consist of in order to enable design to occur. It also addresses the 
presuppositions that are involved in using this knowledge and explores how knowledge of 
phenomena is used in scientific modelling as a crucial part of designing a technology. The question 
then is how such knowledge of phenomena is produced. First and foremost, how do we come to 
know that there is a phenomenon at all? Surely we do so by means of measurements – yet 
measurements produce data, not a picture of the ‘unobservable’ phenomenon. Bogen and 
Woodward (1988)vii have proposed that phenomena are inferred from data. Their view will be 
discussed in Section 3. As an alternative to this view I propose that in scientific practices, predictions 
of the occurrence of an ‘unobservable’ phenomenon are inferred by combining measured and 
observed data describing the specific physical-technological circumstances with conjectured 
knowledge of the phenomenon. However, this still leaves unanswered the question of how 
researchers come to infer to yet unknown phenomena. In Section 4, I follow Feest (2010)viii in arguing 
that a scientific concept of ‘unobservable’ physical phenomena is formed by describing relevant 
aspects of the experimental set-up (including the experimental data). This implies that the concept of 
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a phenomenon is inextricably entangled with aspects of the experimental set-up held responsible for 
its occurrence. In turn, the experimental set-up and the use of all kinds of measurement techniques 
enable further investigation of the phenomenon, thereby producing different kinds of data. In 
Section 5, it is explained how the data thus produced in measurements are organized by means of 
two important epistemic strategies: by mathematization – thus generating (phenomenological) laws 
– and by determining quantities that are characteristic of the materials, substances and objects 
involved.  
  
2. KNOWLEDGE OF PHYSICAL PHENOMENA USED FOR DESIGN  
In the course of explaining ‘how it is possible that scientific knowledge of physical phenomena 
enables designing,’ Boonix addresses the question ‘what scientific knowledge of phenomena is,’ 
focusing on those aspects of knowledge of phenomena that enable this epistemic function. This 
section summarizes those aspects of this account that are relevant to the topic of the current 
chapter. 
A key part of the idea that scientific knowledge of phenomena are epistemic building-blocks for 
designing a technology, is recognizing that physical phenomena should not be considered as 
independent physical entities. Instead, physical phenomena (such as electrical conductivity, magnetic 
resonance or a chemical reaction) manifest at, or are produced by means of specific physical 
conditions and technological circumstances. This implies that a conceptual distinction is needed 
between ‘physical phenomena’ and the ‘physical-technological environment' responsible for their 
occurrence.  
Crucially, the design process depends on the presupposition that given the same conditions, the 
same effects will occur. This presupposition implies that, when we design something, we assume first 
that a phenomenon can be produced by creating (relevant aspects of) the physical-technological 
circumstances held responsible for its occurrence and, conversely, that given specific physical-
technological circumstances the actual occurrence of specific phenomena can be predicted. 
Accordingly, in the engineering sciences – and, more generally, in the experimental sciences – this 
presupposition functions as a regulative principle for producing and applying scientific knowledge of 
physical phenomena. An important feature of this epistemology is that, in the process of design the 
occurrence of all kinds of ‘unobservable’ phenomena – such as chemical reactions, electrical 
conduction, or transfer of compounds between different phases – is assumed based on established 




Scientific knowledge of phenomena that can be used in the process of design, therefore, consists of 
more than a description of something that can be directly observed. It consists first of the scientific 
concept of the phenomenon. Additionally, though, it entails knowledge of physical conditions and (if 
relevant) the technological circumstance at which the phenomenon manifests. It also consists of 
mathematical equations (i.e. laws) that represent the phenomenon as a function of (some of the 
known) causally relevant conditions of its physical-technological environment, by means of which the 
quantitative effects of physical conditions and technological circumstances can be calculated.  
The aim of the design process is to work out how a technological function (e.g. removing toxic 
compounds from an industrial waste gasx) can be constructed in terms of the physical phenomena 
and the physical-technological circumstances that produce this function. This usually involves the 
construction of scientific models that are based on knowledge of potentially relevant physical 
phenomena (P1, .. Pn) and physical-technological circumstances (including knowledge about their 
mutual interactions) by means of which a physical phenomenon (PT) that is held to be responsible for 
the technological function is generated. In this brief example, the technological function ‘waste gas 
cleaning’ is generated by a physical phenomenon (PT)  that is called ‘reactive-absorption of toxic 
compounds in a gas into a fluid.’ The scientific model eventually represents how the desired physical-
phenomenon (PT) is generated in terms of all kinds of interacting phenomena (P1, .. Pn) and physical-
technological circumstances, such as different kinds of transfer and dissolution processes of toxic 
compounds in the gas- and liquid-phase, and different kinds of chemical reactions. 
Constructing these scientific models is an inherent part of technological design. The models enable 
further investigation of how the technology can be built and of the technological production of the 
technological function. For example, scientific models make it possible to create computer 
programmes capable of performing simulations by means of which the technology can be 
investigated. They also enable the design of experimental set-ups in which contributing physical 
phenomena (P1, .. Pi) can be investigated in isolation. 
 
3. DATA AND PHENOMENA 
What are phenomena, and how are they identified if they are not directly observable? Bogen and 
Woodward (1988)xi developed an account of phenomena that seeks to do justice to scientific practice 
by distinguishing between data and phenomena .xii Loosely speaking, data are the observations 
reported by experimental scientists, while phenomena are objective, stable features of the world 
whose existence scientists infer on the basis of reliable data. According to Bogen and Woodward, the 
melting point of lead is inferred or estimated from patterns in observed data; it is not determined by 
observing the result of a single thermometer reading.xiii Hence, their argument for distinguishing 
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between data and phenomena is that data, for the most part, can be straightforwardly and 
uncontroversially observed (e.g. the thermometer readings and the observation that a solid is 
melting) whereas most phenomena are not observable. This distinction is relevant because, 
according to them, data, although observable, are idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts 
and typically cannot occur outside of those contexts. At the same time, data play the role of evidence 
for the existence of phenomena: 
 
‘[D]ata are far more idiosyncratic than phenomena, and furthermore, [...] their production depends 
upon highly irregular coincidences involving a great number of different factors. It follows that 
explanations of data, when they can be given at all, will be highly complex and closely tied to the 
details of particular experimental arrangements. As we vary the method used to detect some 
phenomenon, and other details of the experimental design, the explanation we must give of the data 




I agree with Bogen and Woodward that a distinction must be made between data and phenomena. 
The question is, however, how are phenomena inferred from data? Bogen and Woodward discuss 
two possibilities: phenomena are inferred (1) from patterns of data (e.g. by means of statistical 
inference) or (2) by means of ‘inference to the best explanation’. The second option implies that 
descriptions of phenomena are theories, an implication they seek to avoid for obvious reasons. 
Concerning the first option, however, the two co-authors leave open the question of how scientists 
infer phenomena from data. It is a question which has been debated by several authors. 
One of their critics is James McAllister.xv He summarizes their view as the claim that the function of 
scientific theories is to account for phenomena, which Bogen and Woodward describe as both 
investigator-independent constituents of the world and as corresponding to patterns in data sets. Yet 
according to McAllister this view is incoherent. He proposes instead that phenomena are 
investigator-relative entities. Each one of the countless patterns exhibited by data sets has an equally 
valid claim to the status of phenomenon: each investigator may stipulate which patterns correspond 
to phenomena for him or her. Below, it will become clear that I agree with McAllister on the first 
point. However, I also note that the epistemic uses of observed and measured data suggest that 
scientific researchers agree on epistemic strategies for their organization (Section 5). 
Bruce Glymour (2000) also points out that Bogen and Woodward fail to state how scientists discern 
or discover phenomena in the first place.xvi Bogen and Woodward claim that phenomena do not 
explain data. But if this is so, then we are bound to ask whether phenomena are merely summaries 
of data. Or is there something more to phenomena than just patterns, summaries of data, or 
statistical features? If so, what could this be? Glymour argues that there is not. According to him, 
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scientists infer patterns from data by means of statistical analysis. If we accept this argument, then 
McAllisterxvii is mistaken in thinking that the choice about ‘which patterns to recognize as 
phenomena’ can only be made by the investigator on subjective grounds. Furthermore, Glymour 
argues that, according to Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are nothing more than summaries of 
data, which can be taken to imply that phenomena coincide with patterns in data. Therefore, Bogen 
and Woodward are mistaken in thinking that a distinction between phenomena and data is 
necessary. Instead, according to Glymour, talk of phenomena is superfluous. Certainly Glymour 
makes a powerful argument to contest Bogen and Woodward’s position. However, the argument I 
seek to render plausible here is that a conceptual distinction between ‘data’ and ‘phenomena’ (as 
well as some other conceptual distinctions proposed in this chapter) is crucial for pragmatic reasons 
– namely, to facilitate epistemic uses of measured and observed data. 
At this point, it should be recognized that the distinction between data and phenomena proposed by 
Bogen and Woodward must be understood in the context of efforts to solve two related issues in the 
philosophy of science: how can observations generated by means of experiments constitute evidence 
for theories, and how can the theory-ladenness of observation be circumvented. Against this 
background, Bogen and Woodward propose that facts about phenomena – rather than data – are 
explained by theories: 
 
‘In undertaking to explain phenomena rather than data, a scientist can avoid having to tell an 
enormous number of independent, highly local, and idiosyncratic causal stories involving the (often 
inaccessible and intractable) details of specific experimental and observational contexts. He can focus 




Rather than focus on philosophical issues concerning the justification of theories by means of 
measurements, my aim here is to understand how the design process is enabled by scientific 
knowledge of physical phenomena. As a consequence, my account of physical phenomena 
contradicts Bogen and Woodward on two important points. First, Bogen and Woodward seek to 
avoid portraying phenomena to be some kind of low level theories, whereas in my account, 
‘unobservable’ phenomena are conceptualized, a process involving both empirical and theoretical 
content.xix Second, while I agree with Bogen and Woodward’s claim that physical phenomena exist 
independently of us, I also argue that phenomena are not independent of their physical and (where 
relevant) technological environment. Phenomena are not independent, ‘self-enclosed’, ‘free-floating’ 
physical entities, so to speak. In order to account for this ontological point of view, I have proposed a 
conceptual distinction between physical phenomena and the physical-technological environment 
causally relevant to their manifestation.xx As a consequence, scientific knowledge of physical 
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phenomena involves knowledge of the causal influences exerted by their physical-technological 
environment. Accordingly and contrary to Bogen and Woodward, I claim that the ‘highly complex 
details of experimental arrangements producing the data’ are a relevant part of knowledge of the 
phenomenon. Researchers need to figure out which of these physical and technological details are 
causally relevant to the phenomenon and which are not. This latter aspect of my account is 
supported by the regulative principle that the same physical-technological circumstances will bring 
about the same effects.  
Accordingly, one way in which phenomena are inferred from data is based on this principle. If 
researchers possess scientific knowledge of phenomena P1, ...,Pn, and also know the physical-
technological circumstances of a specific ‘data-producing experimental set-up,’ this knowledge 
enables them to infer the occurrence of physical phenomena Pi in that system, even if the system is 
very different from the experimental set-ups by means of which the individual phenomena Pi were 
discovered and/or investigated. If this account is correct then it serves to explain, contrary to 
Glymourxxi, why a conceptual distinction between descriptions of patterns of data and descriptions of 
physical phenomena is crucial for pragmatic reasons. Without such a distinction, it would be unclear 
how to apply knowledge (i.e. knowledge of mere data patterns gained by means of a specific 
experimental set-up, rather than knowledge of phenomena occurring in specific physical-
technological conditions) to another system, let alone how to apply it in designing another system – 
for, as Bogen and Woodward put it, the data are idiosyncratic to the system that produced them, to 
which I would add that physical phenomena are idiosyncratic to the specific physical-technological 
conditions that produced them. 
 
4. FORMATION OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS OF PHENOMENA IN 
EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICE 
The broader aim of this article is to explain ‘how it is possible that scientific knowledge of physical 
phenomena enables designing.’ In order to answer this question, I contend that the trick is precisely 
not to split it into two apparently obvious, separate questions: how scientific knowledge of physical 
phenomena is possible and, next, how it is possible that this knowledge enables design. The crux lies 
in recognizing that researchers involved in experimental practices produce knowledge of phenomena 
in such a manner that it enables epistemic uses. For instance, knowledge produced by means of 
experiments must be such that it enables new experiments to be designed and their outcomes (i.e. 
the physical phenomena produced by these experiments) to be predicted. In the philosophy of 
science, designing new experiments that are aimed at generating phenomena that are predicted by 
tentative knowledge hypothesized in earlier experiments is commonly interpreted as a methodology 
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initially intended to test the hypothesis (e.g. to test whether the purported phenomenon really does 
exist). Yet in actual experimental practice this approach may also be interpreted differently: 
preliminary knowledge hypothesized in earlier experiments (e.g. a hypothesized physical 
phenomenon or property) can be seen as enabling the design of new experiments which in turn 
facilitate further investigation of the purported object of research (i.e. the phenomenon or property), 
thereby generating new knowledge of it – notably, this may also involve its rejection. The hypothesis 
that describes the purported physical phenomenon or property is a scientific concept. Uljana Feestxxii 
proposes an account of scientific concepts that explains this further. She proposes that we 
 
‘think of the descriptive features of a concept not in terms of whether they can adequately represent 
the object under investigation, but how they enable experimental interventions in the process of 
investigating the purported or ill-understood object. The basic idea here is that concepts figure as 
tools for the investigation of such objects. As such they can contribute to experimental knowledge 






‘The basic point here is that we cannot even begin to study the purported object of research ... unless 
we work with a preliminary understanding of how to empirically individuate the objects that possess 
it. Operational definitions function as tools to this end by providing paradigmatic conditions of 






In brief, Feestxxvi argues that concepts of (in my case) phenomena are formed by creating operational 
definitions of them; these definitions are cast in terms of a description of a typical, paradigmatic 
experimental set-up believed to generate data that are indicative of the phenomenon specified by 
the concept. Furthermore, as a consequence of this account, the descriptive features of these 
concepts do not initially constitute an adequate representation of the phenomenon. Instead, 
according to Feest, concepts are tools which enable experimental intervention in the domain of 
study, thereby generating knowledge about the phenomenon.  
If this account is correct, it implies that: (1) the actual conception of a phenomenon is enabled by the 
description of aspects of an experimental set-up and (2) the resulting scientific concept is entangled 
with that description. This account explains how it is possible that scientific knowledge of physical 
phenomena enables design. When designing advanced technologies, researchers do not need 
knowledge of phenomena independent of the physical-technological environment responsible for 
their occurrence or manifestation. On the contrary, they need knowledge of the physical effects 
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produced by a physical-technological environment (e.g. as generated by means of the experimental 
set-up) and, more specifically, they need to know which features of this environment are crucial for 
the occurrence of that effect. This is exactly what an operational definition of a phenomenon such as 
the one proposed by Feestxxvii seems to provide. In other words, this account explains how scientific 
concepts of phenomena (e.g. objects, processes, properties) are formed so that these concepts can 
be put to epistemic use in design processes.  
In Boon (2012)xxviii, I elaborate on the account of scientific concepts proposed by Feestxxix, arguing 
that the process of inferring from the description of aspects of an experimental set-up an operational 
definition of a phenomenon, which, in turn can be used as a scientific concept involves subsuming 
this description under more abstract concepts, such as naming it as an ‘object’, a ‘property’, or a 
‘causal relationship’, and under theoretical concepts, such as ‘force’, ‘energy’, ‘fluid’, etc. I argue that 
subsuming an empirical description under such abstract and theoretical concepts makes them 
theoretical rather than strictly empirical, as it introduces new epistemic content that expands on 
what is empirically known and is therefore also hypothetical. It is exactly this additional epistemic 
content that enables asking new questions by means of which the investigation of the phenomenon 
moves forward. Furthermore, the additional abstract and theoretical content enables epistemic uses 
of these concepts in new circumstances, as will be shown below.  
Examples of phenomena – also called properties – in the engineering sciences that have been 
conceptualized by means of paradigmatic experiments include material properties such as ‘elasticity’, 
‘viscosity’, ‘heat content’, ‘melting point’, ‘electrical resistance’, ‘thermal conductivity’, ‘magnetic 
permeability’, ‘physical hysteresis’, ‘crystallinity’, ‘refractivity’, ‘chemical affinity’, ‘wavelength’, 
‘chemical diffusivity’, ‘solubility’, ‘electrical field strength’, ‘super-conductivity’, and ‘atomic force’.  
The concept of each of these properties is related to experiments by means of which they were 
initially defined. Hooke’s experimental set-up, for instance, in which the extension of a spring was 
measured as a function of its weight, can be regarded as a paradigmatic experiment by means of 
which the property ‘elasticity’ was operationally defined. The description of the paradigmatic 
experiment might be formulated as follows: ‘to measure the reversible (and proportional) extension 
of a spring by a weight,’ which is the observable phenomenon. The preliminary operational definition 
of ‘elasticity’ derived from it could be rendered as ‘the property of a spring to reverse its stretch 
when extended by a weight.’ Accordingly, the description of the paradigmatic experiment is 
subsumed under a more abstract concept (e.g. the concept ‘property’) and also – as elasticity is 
conceived of as a kind of force – under the theoretical concept ‘force’, which results in the scientific 
concept ‘elasticity’ being defined as ‘the measurable property of an object to reverse a deformation 
imposed by a force.’  
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In other words, researchers infer an operational definition of a phenomenon from a description of a 
paradigmatic experiment: the definition is cast in terms of a description of the paradigmatic 
experimental set-up. In a subsequent step the operational definition, by being interpreted as a 
definition of a property and by interpreting the observed phenomenon in terms of theoretical 
concepts, is turned into a scientific concept which can be applied to situations that differ from the 
paradigmatic experimental set-up: wherever the reversible deformation of an object occurs, we 
attribute the property ‘elasticity’ to the object and assume that it is a quantifiable property, 
independent of the kind of object, the kind of matter and the kind of force involved. Therefore, the 
concept ‘elasticity’ refers to a qualitative and quantifiable property of materials or substances while 
at the same time expressing aspects of the paradigmatic experiment significant for the occurrence of 
elasticity. 
Note that, from a theory-oriented perspective, the epistemological approach in Hooke’s experiment 
is interpreted differently. Van Fraassen (2012)xxx, for instance, may critically ask: ‘what quantity does 
Hooke’s measurement measure?’, going on to argue that this involves a theory-dependent answer: 
‘Whether a procedure is a measurement and, if so, what it measures are questions that have, in 
general, answers only relative to a theory.’ Van Fraassen refers to Galileo’s design of an apparatus to 
measure the force of a vacuum (in his Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences) and argues that, 
from Galileo’s point of view, this apparatus measures the magnitude of the force of the vacuum, 
although from a later point of view it is measuring a parameter absent from Galileo’s theory, namely, 
atmospheric pressure. However, in many cases, experimental findings precede theory. Furthermore, 
whether experimental findings are interpreted as measuring ‘something’ also depends on aspects of 
the experiment itself, such as its stability and reproducibility. Hence, although I am not in 
disagreement with Van Fraassenxxxi, one of the consequences of shifting the focus to the role of 
experiments in producing and investigating physical phenomena, as proposed in this article, is that 
experimental practices may also give rise to a different epistemology. The proposal made here is that 
the interpretation of experimental findings involves formulating a scientific concept in terms of an 
operational definition and subsuming this empirical description under abstract and theoretical 
concepts. The covering concepts, such as ‘property’ and ‘force’, are not initially derived from 
theories, as Van Fraassen suggests, but have first and foremost an everyday meaning; applying them 
in contexts beyond their everyday uses in the ways just mentioned makes them theoretical.xxxii  
Does this account indeed provide an understanding of how researchers produce scientific knowledge 
of phenomena such that it enables epistemic uses in the design process? In line with Feestxxxiii, I 
suggest that the scientific concept thus formed enables additional experimental investigation of the 
purported phenomenon because it is phrased in terms of a description of a paradigmatic 
experimental set-up. In sum, the scientific concept together (and entangled) with knowledge of the 
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paradigmatic experimental set-up make it possible to investigate the phenomenon or property in 
varying physical conditions and technological circumstances. In such experimental research, the 
space of causally relevant technological and physical variables is explored, wherein the original 
physical-technological conditions of the experimental set-up will be varied and extended using all 
kinds of often newly developed measurement techniques. 
 
5. PHENOMENA AND PROPERTIES – THEIR MEASUREMENT AND 
MATHEMATIZATION 
Authors in the philosophy of science such as Bogen and Woodward, do not usually distinguish 
between properties and phenomena, whereas scientific practices do. It was suggested above that in 
the distinct uses of these terms, a phenomenon is the actual manifestation of a property and that, 
conversely, a property is a capacity that manifests under specific conditions. Yet scientific practices 
employ an additional distinction, that is, between phenomena and measurable quantities that are 
characteristic of a material or object (such as a technological device). Measurable quantities are also 
called characteristic or specific properties but are often referred to as just ‘properties of a material or 
object’.xxxiv In this section, I seek to elucidate how the determination of characteristic quantities of 
materials and objects is important as an epistemic strategy for producing knowledge of physical 
phenomena. 
Experimental investigations of a purported phenomenon, such as those as outlined in the previous 
section, produce different kinds of large amounts of data. In order to be useful for performing 
epistemic functions, these data must be efficiently organized. One of the well-known strategies in 
scientific research for doing so is to establish mathematical relationships (e.g. proportionality) 
between measured data.xxxv Hooke’s law, for instance, describes the extension of a spring, X, as a 
function of the exerted force, F, and a constant factor, k, the elasticity coefficient of a spring. Stated 
more generally, these kinds of equations describe the phenomenon (e.g. ‘deformation of an elastic 
object by means of exerting a force’) as a function of variable quantities (i.e. causally relevant 
technological circumstances such as length and width of the spring, and physical conditions such as 
temperature and pressure) and some more stable quantities that characterize the substance, 
material, object, or system under study (e.g. the elasticity coefficient of a material or object). 
Accordingly, in constructing these kinds of mathematical equations for describing measured data (i.e. 
phenomenological laws), a conceptual distinction is made for pragmatic reasons between (1) variable 
quantities typical of the phenomenon, (2) variable physical and technological quantities affecting or 
determining the phenomenon and (3) more stable quantities characteristic of the substances, 
materials, objects and systems involved. 
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Generally speaking, the aim of experimental practices is to characterize substances, materials, 
objects and systems in terms of stable, quantifiable physical properties, that is, stable quantities 
called characteristic properties. These stable quantities are derived from measurements by 
converting measured data to a quantity per characteristic unit of the substance, material, object or 
systems, such as per unit of mass, molecules, electrons, length, surface, volume, time, or 
temperature. For instance, the density of a material is the measured weight of this material per 
characteristic unit of volume (e.g. cubic meter) of this material; the elasticity coefficient of a spring is 
its extension per unit of length of the spring and per unit of mass causing its extension; the heat 
transfer coefficient of a material is the measured Joules transferred per unit of time, per unit of 
surface, per unit of length (thickness), and per unit of temperature difference between the two 
surfaces of the material. Note that the inference from measured data to characteristic stable 
quantities is only justified if the proportionality has been experimentally tested. Also note that the 
values of these stable quantities are usually still dependent on causally relevant conditions. The 
density and the elasticity coefficient of a specific material, for instance, are affected by its 
temperature. Similarly, in the case of such causal influences on ‘stable’ quantities, researchers will 
deal with this using the same epistemic strategy, namely, constructing mathematical equations that 
describe the property (such as the elasticity coefficient) as a function of variable quantities (i.e. 
causally relevant physical conditions and technological circumstances). The latter equations may 
entail yet other stable quantities that characterize the substance, material, object, or system under 
study (e.g. its molar weight, its specific heat constant). Hence, again and again, the same epistemic 
strategies of experimentation and mathematization are used in producing scientific knowledge of 
phenomena and properties. 
The values of characteristic properties of materials etc. are most reliably measured by standardized 
measurement methods.xxxvi These values are summarized in handbooks such as the classic CRC 
Handbook of Chemistry and Physics.xxxvii Significantly, any one kind of property can be determined of 
many different kinds of materials (e.g. the elasticity coefficient of different kinds of materials or the 
melting point of different kinds of metals and fluids). Conversely, any one kind of material (e.g. gold) 
allows for determining many different kinds of properties (e.g. its density, melting point, electrical 
conductivity coefficient and elasticity coefficient). Besides being convenient for constructing 
mathematical equations to describe phenomena, the values of characteristic properties of materials 
etc. are also useful for comparing differences between materials (or substances, objects and 
systems), which is important for design.  
Similarly, specific physical properties of types of technological processes and systems can be 
determined using standardized measurement methods. Mathematical equations and values 
describing these quantities are summarized in engineering handbooks.xxxviii 
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Although the qualitative and quantitative measurements used to establish physical properties are 
reproducible, there is nothing ‘essential’ about them. The point being made here is that physical 
quantities are reproducibly and stably produced by means of contingent technological instruments 
and measurement procedures, which reproducibly and stably determine the measurement 
outcomes.xxxix In other words, given the regulative principle stating that under the same physical 
conditions the same quantitative and qualitative effects will occur, the manifestation of these 
quantities is inevitable, that is, their occurrence is produced and determined by the physical-
technological system and procedure used.xl However, this also implies that there is no point in 
claiming that materials have properties that are in some way essential. Conversely, as soon as a 
technologically produced property (such as ‘elasticity,’ ‘electrical resistance,’ and ‘melting point’) has 
been conceptualized, this property can often be determined (in principle, although not always in 
practice) of many other materials as well. In other words, these properties are made manifest in 
other materials by means of new measurement techniques together with the concept of that new 
property. 
Another consequence of the observation that many properties manifest only through the 
technological and physical conditions produced in an experimental set-up is that there is not an 
essential or limited set of physical properties. On the contrary, the number of different kinds of 
properties of substances, materials and systems increases with technological instrumentation and 
experimentation and with the theoretical interpretation of their outcomes. A sign of this increase can 
be witnessed in the CRC Handbook mentioned above, which contains new properties in every new 
edition: in the first edition of 1914, for example, all the measured physical properties covered some 
100 pages while in the 94th edition of 2014 they covered more than 2600 pages.  
Expanding on the point just made, many material properties and phenomena result only from 
technological interventions and interactions, that is to say, their existence and/or their manifestation 
depends on specific causally relevant conditions brought about by means of the physical conditions 
of technological instruments and procedures. Why would researchers be interested in investigating 
them? We only have to skim through the CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics to begin guessing 
at the answer to this question. Why, for example, would they be interested in physical phenomena 
such as diffusion, heat transfer and electrical conduction in different types of material? And why 
should they measure for different types of materials’ characteristic properties such as the melting 
point, specific heat content, diffusion coefficient, electrical resistance coefficient and so on and so 
forth, other than for their technological relevance? Indeed, it can be said of many of the properties 
and phenomena that have been investigated that the researchers involved were not so much 
interested in them in order to test theories; instead, most properties and phenomena are studied out 





Traditionally, the philosophy of science has assumed that theories are the ultimate aim of science 
and has therefore considered the role of experiments and measurements in discovering and testing 
scientific theories. In this article, the role of measurements and experiments has been considered in 
a different context, namely, in relation to the question of how it is possible that scientific knowledge 
of physical properties and phenomena enables designing – or, should we say, inventing – advanced 
technologies. The pragmatic approach taken to articulate an epistemology that accounts for the 
production of scientific knowledge through measurement and mathematization such that this 
knowledge enables design additionally gives rise to a novel pragmatic position on the character of 
scientific knowledge that is significant for the philosophy of science more generally: One of the 
points resulting from this analysis is that the explanation of successful uses of scientific knowledge, 
such as their uses in technology, seems not to be in need of the kind of justification which 
philosophers of science often seek to provide. The crucial point in developing an explanation of how 
it is possible that scientific knowledge of physical phenomena enables designing is that this question 
should not be analyzed in terms of two separate questions, how is scientific knowledge of physical 
phenomena possible? and how does this knowledge make design possible? The crux lies in 
recognizing that researchers engaging in experimental practices produce scientific knowledge of 
phenomena such that it enables epistemic uses in epistemic activities such as designing. Further, 
from an epistemological perspective some aspects of the process of design appear to be very similar 
to the scientific methodology of deriving verifiable predictions that are tested in experiments, thus 
enabling the hypothesis in question to be tested and improved (i.e. the hypothetical-deductive 
method). However, focusing on the epistemic uses of scientific knowledge produced by experimental 
set-ups reveals that these epistemic uses are actually inextricably linked with measurable and 
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